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Abstract Most security models for authenticated key
exchange (AKE) do not explicitly model the associated cer-
tification system, which includes the certification authority
and its behaviour. However, there are several well-known
and realistic attacks on AKE protocols which exploit vari-
ous forms of malicious key registration and which therefore
lie outside the scope of these models. We provide the first
systematic analysis of AKE security incorporating certifica-
tion systems. We define a family of security models that, in
addition to allowing different sets of standard AKE adver-
sary queries, also permit the adversary to register arbitrary
bitstrings as keys. For this model family, we prove generic
results that enable the design and verification of protocols
that achieve security even if some keys have been produced
maliciously. Our approach is applicable to a wide range of
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models and protocols; as a concrete illustration of its power,
we apply it to the CMQV protocol in the natural strengthen-
ing of the eCK model to the ASICS setting.
Keywords Authenticated key exchange (AKE) ·Unknown
key share (UKS) attacks · Certification authority (CA) ·
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1 Introduction
After public key encryption and digital signatures, authenti-
cated key establishment (AKE) is perhaps the most impor-
tant public key primitive. From a real-world perspective,
AKE protocols relying on public key techniques are widely
deployed in systems that are used every day by billions of
users, including systems such as TLS, IPsec, SSH, and var-
ious single sign-on systems. From a theoretical perspective,
formal, cryptographically sound modelling for AKE proto-
cols began in the symmetric setting with the seminal work
of Bellare and Rogaway [5], and was later extended to the
public key setting [7]. Since then, there has been a large
body of work in this tradition, and many additions and mod-
ifications have been proposed. The most prominent current
models in this tradition [4,14,32,43] strengthen or add to the
required security properties, cover different protocol classes,
and strengthen adversary powers.
Despite intensive study over two decades, important ele-
ments of AKE protocols have not been sufficiently modelled,
preventing our deeper understanding of this important prim-
itive and limiting its applicability to real-world protocols.
Specifically, the public key infrastructure (PKI) needed to
support the authenticity of public keys in AKE, and the
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interactions between the certification authority (CA), hon-
est parties, and the adversary, are rarely modelled. Rather,
with exceptions as noted below, in typical AKE models and
proofs it is assumed that all public keys are honestly gener-
ated and authentically distributed at the start of the security
game, and that there is a single key per party; certificates are
excluded from the model. The adversary can corrupt parties,
learning all their secrets, but has limited ability to register
malicious keys. Roughly speaking, this modelling approach
corresponds to an ideal CA, who zealously generates perfect
key pairs and securely distributes them to the correct parties.
However, CAs in the real world simply do not operate
in such rigorous ways. They have differing strengths of
procedures for checking claimed identities,1 so malicious
parties might in some cases get arbitrary public keys certi-
fied against identifiers of their choice. The most egregious
examples involve CAs who, either willingly, under coercion,
or as a result of security compromises, have issued certifi-
cates for keys and identifiers that they should not have.2 CAs
following best practices may require that a user requesting
a certificate submit a certificate signing request (CSR, as
per [44]) to the CA. This involves the user self-signing the
data that is to be certified. Various standards [1,2,41] include
other approaches to providing proofs of possession. How-
ever, even these basic tests of private key ownership are not
mentioned in industry guidelines issued by the CA/Browser
Forum [12,13]. Furthermore, these procedures all fall short
of the proofs of knowledge [40] required to match what is
assumed in typical AKE models. Thus, an attacker may be
able to register another party’s public key under his own iden-
tifier or register a malformed key which then interacts with
properly generated keys in an unfortunate way.
Critically, there are realistic attacks on AKE protocols
which cannot be captured by AKE security models that omit
CA and PKI aspects:
– Kaliski’s unknown key share (UKS) attack [28] on early
versions of MQV exploits the ability of the adversary to
dynamically register a public key (which is valid and for
which the adversary does know the secret key).
– The UKS attack on KEA described by Lauter and
Mityagin [33, p. 380] exploits the adversary’s ability to
re-register some party’s static public key as his own pub-
lic key.
1 For example, issuance of Extended Validation (EV) certificates
requires stronger identity-checking requirements than non-EV certifi-
cates, see https://www.cabforum.org/certificates.html for more details.
2 In June and July 2011, Dutch CA DigiNotar was hacked [23], with
the intruder taking control of all 8 of the CA’s signing servers; at least
531 rogue certificates were then issued. In August 2011, TURKTRUST
CA [21] issued special certificates with wildcard signing capabilities,
allowing impersonation of any domain in the Internet. This was discov-
ered, by coincidence, only 18 months later.
– Blake-Wilson andMenezes [9] introduced the duplicate-
signature key selection (DSKS) attack on signature
schemes: after observing a user’s signature σ on a mes-
sage m, the adversary E is able to compute a signature
key pair (skE , vkE ) (or sometimes just a verification key
vkE ) such that σ is also E’s signature on the message m.
Now, for example, if the Station-to-Station (STS) pro-
tocol is implemented using a signature scheme that is
vulnerable to DSKS attacks, and the adversary can reg-
ister arbitrary public keys with the CA, then the protocol
is vulnerable to an online UKS attack [9].
– In Lim and Lee small subgroup attacks [34], the adver-
sary extracts partial (or even complete) information about
a party’s long-term secret key. Some of these attacks
require registering invalid public keyswith the CAbefore
engaging in protocol runs with honest participants. Of
particular note are the Lim–Lee-style attacks ofMenezes
and Ustaoglu [37] on the HMQV protocol [30].
We claim that to date there has been no systematic treat-
ment in the literature of the behaviour of CAs with respect to
public keys and identifiers chosen by the adversary and, relat-
edly, the treatment of public keys and ephemeral values by
protocol participants (especially with respect to group mem-
bership testing). Our paper sets out to rectify this situation,
providing a comprehensive and self-contained treatment of
these features, as well as establishing generic results to make
protocols resilient against such attacks.
1.1 Contributions
Our paper has three main contributions.
First, we present in Sect. 2 a framework for reasoning
about the security of AKE protocols with respect to various
CA key registration procedures. This framework allows us to
capture several attacks based on adversarial key registration,
including UKS attacks, small subgroup attacks, attacks that
occur when the CA does not check if public keys are regis-
tered twice, and attacks that occur when multiple public keys
can be registered per identifier.
Second, we provide in Sect. 3 a generic approach to
achieve strong security guarantees against adversaries that
can register arbitrary public keys for certain types of pro-
tocols. In particular, we show how to transform Diffie–
Hellman-type AKE protocols that are secure in a model
where only honest key registration is allowed into protocols
that are secure even when adversaries can register arbitrary
valid or invalid public keys. In such cases, security is still
guaranteed for all sessions (that were considered clean or
fresh in the base model) except those in which the peer’s
public key is valid but registered by the adversary.
Third,wedemonstrate inSect. 4 howourmethodology can
be used to establish strong security guarantees, even when
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the adversary can register arbitrary public keys, for concrete
protocols such as CMQV, NAXOS, and UP, using CMQV as
a running example. We provide in Sect. 5 recommendations
for the design of protocols that are secure in our models.
This article extends our previous conference paper [11].
1.2 Related work
The original computational model for key exchange of Bel-
lare and Rogaway [5] has a long-lived key generator, which
is used to initialize all parties’ keys at the start of the game.
This is a standard part of most computational models today.
However, in common with several later models [14,27,31],
the adversary cannot influence long-term keys: only honestly
generated keys are considered. Starting with the 1995 model
of Bellare and Rogaway [6], it was recognized that the adver-
sarymay be able to choose long-term keys for certain parties,
whether public keys or symmetric keys. It is possible to iden-
tify three differentmethods that have been used tomodel such
an adversary capability.
1. The adversary can replace long-term keys by providing
them as an input to a corrupt query. This was the method
used originally by Bellare and Rogaway [6] and was sub-
sequently used in the public key setting by others [8,38].
2. The adversary is allowed to generate arbitrary keys for
corrupted parties at any time during the protocol run [30].
3. An additional query is added specifically to set up a user
with a new key chosen by the adversary [16,25,46]. This
query is typically called establishparty and takes as
input the user name and its long-term public key.
These methods allow the models to capture the Kaliski
attack [28], which requires the adversary to register a
new public key after certain protocol messages have been
obtained. However, none of these currently used methods
has the generality of our model and, in particular, all of them
omit the following realistic features:
– registration of multiple public keys per user;
– flexible checking by certification authorities via a verifi-
cation procedure;
– adversarial choice of public keys per session.
Special mention should also be made of the model of
Shoup [43]. Unlike most popular AKE models today, it
uses a simulatability definition of security comparing ideal
and real-world views. Security is defined to mean that for
any real-world adversary there is an ideal world adversary
(benign by definition) such that the transcripts of the two are
computationally indistinguishable. Real-world adversaries
have the ability to assign users to public key certificates.
Shoup’s model has not been widely used and the examples
in [43] are not fully worked through. Furthermore, the model
cannot represent an adversary who obtains only ephemeral
secret keys without knowing the long-term key of the same
user and therefore cannot capture security properties com-
mon in more modern models.3
Cash et al. [15] and Hofheinz et al. [24] have consid-
ered the security of non-interactive key exchange (NIKE)
in settings where the adversary can register arbitrary public
keys, analogously to our ASICS setting for interactive key
exchange. It is an interesting open problem to examine how
the security models and constructions for NIKE [15,24] can
be built upon to achieve security in the ASICS setting.
Boldyreva et al. [10]model certification andPKI for public
key encryption and signatures. They point to legitimate con-
cerns regardingwhat certification authorities can be expected
to check in practice. It is interesting to note thatwhile they use
key exchange as a prime motivating example for modelling
certification, key exchange is not explored in their models.
Nevertheless, this and related follow-up work [10,22] are in
the spirit of our work: like ours, their models allow (amongst
other things) corrupt key registration. However, they do not
allow the adversary to reveal long-term or ephemeral keys,
which is fundamental to modern AKE security models.
Critically, all of the approaches mentioned above have
only been used to establish results for a handful of specific
protocols. In contrast, we establish generic results that facil-
itate the design and verification of AKE protocols and that
can be applied to a large class of protocols.
2 ASICS model family
In this section, we define a parameterized AKE security
model that allows for explicit modelling of the certification
of public keys. Prominent AKE security frameworks can be
instantiated in this family of models, as well as extensions
that allow dynamic adversarial registration of arbitrary bit-
strings as public keys.
Generally speaking, from a user’s point of view, par-
ticipation in key exchange encompasses three consecutive
phases: First, users set up their individual key pairs;more pre-
cisely, each user invokes a randomized algorithm KeyGen
that outputs a fresh secret key/public key pair (sk,pk). Sec-
ond, users contact a certification authority (CA) to get their
keys certified: each user provides the CA with its identi-
fier Pˆ and its public key pk, and obtains a certificate C
that binds the identifier to the key. After completing these
setup steps, in the third phase, users can engage in inter-
active sessions with other users to establish shared keys.
3 An early version of [43] from April 1999 in fact did allow reveal-
ing session state without simultaneously revealing long-term secrets.
However, this option disappeared in all later versions of the paper.
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To do so, they usually require knowledge of their own
key pair (sk,pk), their identifier Pˆ , and the corresponding
certificate C . In addition to that, protocols may require a
priori knowledge of (a subset of) the peer’s public key pk′,
peer’s identifier Qˆ, and peer’s certificate C ′. As we will see,
our execution model is general enough to cover all these
settings.
To ease notation, we assume that public key pk and
identifier Pˆ can be readily derived from any certificate C ;
we use notation C.pk = pk and C.id = Pˆ correspond-
ingly. This assumption holds for all practical PKIs we are
aware of, and in particular for X.509 certificates (as used
in SSL/TLS); the latter carry public key and identifier in
a canonically formatted data structure. In potential other
cases, where keys and identifiers cannot be extracted from
certificates but instead are auxiliary input to the verifica-
tion routine, certificates can still be expected to be valid for
only a single key/identifier pair, i.e., the mapping from C
to compatible pk and Pˆ is again unambiguous. Proposed
notations C.pk and C.id are hence meaningful also in such
cases.
Here, we focus on the interaction between users and the
CA that occurs in the certification process. We enable the
modelling of different degrees of rigour in the checks of
consistency and ownership of public keys pk presented to
the CA. On the one hand, CAs could be pedantic with such
verifications (e.g., require a proof of knowledge4 of the secret
key corresponding to pk); on the other hand, CAs could also
just accept any given bitstring pk as valid and issue a certifi-
cate on it. The ability to precisely assess the security of key
establishment in the face of different CA behaviours is a key
contribution of our new model family.
Definition 1 An ASICS protocol Π consists of a set of
domain parameters, a key generation algorithm KeyGen,
a public key verification procedure VP, and the protocol
descriptionπ that describes how key exchange protocol mes-
sages are generated and responded to as well as how the
session key is derived.
We denote by VP the specific verification procedure on
public keys and identifiers that a considered CA deploys. As
different checks on pk and Pˆ might require different levels
of interaction between the registering user and the CA, for
example with the use of state by the CA, wemodel it as a pro-
cedure, as opposed to a function. VP takes as input a public
key and an identifier. To enable the specification of realistic
4 Although interactive or non-interactive zero-knowledge proof sys-
tems seem to yield ideal solutions in this context, standards like X.509,
OpenPGP, and PKCS#10 content themselves with the purely heuristic
(and inferior) approach of demanding a so-called proof-of-possession
(PoP), mostly implemented via self-signed certificates or self-signed
certificate requests (cf. [1,41]). The security of such constructions seems
to be difficult to formally assess [40].
VP behaviour, we additionally allow the definition of VP to
access elements of the game state, as we will see in Exam-
ple 1. We require that VP is efficient and has binary output.
Furthermore, we require that the CA issues the requested cer-
tificate only if VP outputs value 1; all certification requests
whereVP outputs value 0 are rejected. Note that, for simplic-
ity, we only consider non-interactive verification procedures
(i.e., two-message registration protocols) between the user
and the CA. A more general treatment covering interactive
verification procedures as well would introduce additional
complexities to our framework.
Specific key exchange protocols might be insecure for
one (liberal) instantiation of VP, and be secure for another
(stricter) one. Note that CAs that do not perform any check
on pk and Pˆ are modelled by a verification procedure VP
that always outputs 1. A verification procedure that performs
few checks may output 1 for at least all pk ∈ PK, where PK
denotes the set of possible public keys output by KeyGen.
Precisely, if the input of algorithm KeyGen is security para-
meter 1k and the used randomness is r ∈R {0, 1}k , then we
define
PK = {pk ∣∣ ∃r, sk : r ∈ {0, 1}k ∧ KeyGen(1k; r)
= (sk,pk)}.
A verification procedure with high assurance may require a
zero-knowledge argument that the requester knows the secret
key corresponding to the public key, and even that the key
was generated verifiably at random. Note that we allow VP
to keep an internal state between invocations; our model
hence covers possible implementations of CAs that reject
certification requests with public keys that have already been
registered (e.g., for a different identifier).
2.1 Security model
At a high level, our model stipulates users that generate
one or more keys, obtain certificates for these keys from a
CA, and use keys and certificates to run (potentially concur-
rent) sessions of the key agreement protocol. Similar to other
security models [5,14], the adversary controls all communi-
cation in these sessions, corrupts users at will to obtain their
secret keys, and arbitrarily reveals established session keys.
Innovative is the adversary’s additional ability to steer the
registration process with the CA: it can obtain from the CA
valid certificates for public keys and identifiers of its choos-
ing (as long as VP evaluates to 1), and can forward such
certificates to users.
To keep our model simple and comprehensible, we
abstract away any forgeability issues of certificates and
assume the following ideal functionality: no certificate will
be considered valid unless it has been issued by the CA. We
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Table 1 Elements of session state
acert Certificate of the actor (the user running this session)
pcert Certificate of this session’s peer
role Taken role; either I (initiator) or R (responder)
sent Concatenation of all messages sent in this session
rcvd Concatenation of all messages received in this session
status Session status; either active,accepted, or rejected
key Key in {0, 1}k established in this session
rand Randomness used in this session
data Any additional protocol-specific data
model this by letting the challenger keep a list C of all CA-
issued certificates and by equipping users with a certificate
verification oracle OCV that checks membership in that list;
concretely, we assume that OCV (C) = 1 ⇔ C ∈ C. Of
course, in concrete implementations, this oracle is replaced
by an explicit local verification routine; for instance, if cer-
tification is implemented via a signature scheme, this will
include its verification procedure (besides further checking
of validity, chain validity, revocation state, etc.).
2.1.1 Sessions and session state
Users, once they have created their keys and obtained corre-
sponding certificates, can execute protocol sessions. Within
a user, each such session is uniquely identified by a pair
s = (C, i), where C denotes the certificate used by the user
(by himself) in that session, and i is a counter. The user main-
tains session-specific variables as indicated in Table 1. Some
session variables are fixed upon session creation, whereas
others can be assigned or updated during protocol execution.
Some, such as pcert, status, and key, are considered to be
outputs of the key establishment andmight be used in higher-
level protocols or applications. A session s has accepted if
sstatus = accepted.
2.1.2 Adversarial queries
The adversary interacts with users by issuing queries.
The adversary can direct users to establish long-term key
pairs and certificates (kgen,hregister), to initiate proto-
col sessions (create), and to respond to protocol messages
(send). The adversary may be able to learn long-term keys
(corrupt), session-specific randomness (randomness), or
session keys (session-key) from users. The adversary can
alsomaliciously obtain certificates from theCA (pkregister,
npkregister).
Thequeries in setQN ={kgen,hregister, create, send},
defined as follows, model normal operation of the protocol;
they are required in any securitymodel. Initially, the auxiliary
variables HK, C, Ch, Cpk, and Cnpk are set to ∅.
– kgen () By running algorithmKeyGen, a fresh key pair
(sk,pk) is generated. Public key pk is returned to the
adversary; secret key sk is stored for processing potential
later queries corresponding topk. The public key is added
to the set of honestly generated keys:HK ← HK∪{pk}.
– hregister(pk, Pˆ) The query requires that pk ∈ HK
and that VP outputs 1 on input pk5 and Pˆ; otherwise,
it returns ⊥. The public key pk is registered at the CA
for the identifier Pˆ . The resulting certificate C is added
to the global set of certificates and to the set of honestly
generated certificates: C ← C ∪{C} and Ch ← Ch ∪{C}.
The query returns C .
– create
(
s = (C, i) , r, [C ′]) The query requires that
C ∈ Ch , that a session with counter i for certificate C
does not already exist, and that r ∈ {I,R}; otherwise, it
returns ⊥. A new session s is created for the user with
public keyC.pk and identifierC.id. Session variables are
initialized as
(sacert, spcert, srole, ssent, srcvd, sstatus, skey)
← (C,⊥, r, , ,active,⊥).
If the optional certificate C ′ is provided, we set spcert ←
C ′. In addition, a string in {0, 1}k is sampled uniformly
at random and assigned to srand; we assume that all ran-
domness required during the execution of session s is
deterministically derived from srand. The user also runs
the initialization procedure for the key exchange proto-
col, which may further initialize its own (internal) state
variable sdata and optionally generate a message M . If M
was generated, set ssent ← M , and return M ; otherwise,
return ⊥.
– send (s, M) Thequery requires that session s exists and
that sstatus = active; otherwise, it returns ⊥. The user
continues the protocol execution for this session with
incoming message M , which may optionally generate
a response message M ′. Next, srcvd is set to (srcvd ‖ M)
and, if M ′ is output, ssent is set to (ssent ‖ M ′). The pro-
tocol execution may (re-)assign values to sstatus and skey,
and to the session’s internal state variable sdata. Also, if
the value spcert was not provided to the create query,
then protocol execution may assign a value to spcert. (For
example, in TLS the client does not learn the server’s
certificate until it receives the ServerCertificate
message.) If M ′ was generated, return M ′; otherwise
return ⊥.
5 Reasonable implementations of VP output 1 on all keys pk ∈ HK,
because HK ⊆ PK.
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Remark 1 (Multiple CAs) Our model stipulates a PKI with
a single CA. This could be a limitation for the analysis of
scenarios with multiple CAs. However, as we argue next,
implicitly we do capture at least those multi-CA settings
where CAs issue certificates fully independently of each
other (as do the CAs of the PKI currently in place to secure
web traffic in the Internet) and we believe that our approach
hence reaches the majority of practically relevant scenar-
ios. Concretely, verification procedures in independently
working multi-CA settings can be readily emulated in our
single-CA framework as follows: if VP1, . . . ,VPn denote
the verification procedures of n independent CAs, then com-
posed verification procedure VP1...n that outputs 1 if there
exists at least one i, 1 ≤ i ≤ n, such that VPi outputs 1,
effectively folds the n procedures into a single one, ade-
quately modelling verification in the multi-CA setting. Note
that we allow an individual CA to maintain state, such as a
list of certificates that it has already issued, but we do not
assume any joint state between multiple CAs. We remark
that the situation in a multi-CA setting where CAs interact
is much more involved. For instance, lifting the CA behav-
iours suggested in Examples 1(b) and (c) to a setting with
multiple CAs requires the latter to consistently operate on
specific global data structures; this seems inherently hard to
implement (as, amongst others, it would implicitly solve the
consensus problem in distributed systems).
Remark 2 (One key for many identifiers) A frequently
observed setting in the web PKI is that users hold one public
key that they bind to a set of identifiers (with the correspond-
ing number of certificates). This happens, for instance, if
globally acting companies register domain names in several
different countries, but process HTTPS requests on a sin-
gle centralized facility. Observe that our model covers such
cases of multiple registration of a key: hregister may be
queriedmany times for the samepk.Moreover, throughbeing
identified by pairs (C, i) (as opposed to (pk, i)), sessions
associated with one pk are aware of the identifier C.id in
use.
The queries in set QS = {randomness, session-key,
corrupt} model the corruption of a user’s secrets. Similar
queries are found in other standard AKE models [5,14].
– corrupt (pk) The query requires pk ∈ HK; otherwise,
it returns ⊥. This query returns the secret key sk corre-
sponding to public key pk.
– randomness (s) The query requires that session s
exist; otherwise, it returns ⊥. The query returns the ran-
domness srand.
– session-key (s) The query requires that session s exist
and that sstatus = accepted; otherwise, it returns ⊥.
The query returns the session key skey.
Remark 3 The randomness query gives the adversary
access to the randomness srand that is used in a particu-
lar session. Formally, one may think of the session as an
instance of a probabilistic Turing machine: the query gives
the adversary the values that are read from the random tape.
Practically, this models a randomness generator whose val-
ues are revealed after they are produced, for example, by a
side-channel attack. This is similar to the ephemeral key
reveal query from [32].
The hregister query introduced above only allows reg-
istration of keys pk ∈ HK, i.e., keys held by honest users.
In contrast, the adversary can obtain certificates on arbitrary
(valid) public keys using the following pkregister query.
Going even further, the npkregister query allows registra-
tion of objects that are not even public keys (always assuming
thatVP outputs 1 on the candidate object). These queries will
allow modelling Kaliski’s attack on MQV [28] and small
subgroup attacks [34], amongst others. We emphasize that
the queries in set QR = {pkregister,npkregister} have no
counterparts in standard definitions of key exchange security.
– pkregister(pk, Pˆ) The query requires that pk ∈ PK
and that VP outputs 1 on input pk and Pˆ; otherwise,
it returns ⊥. The public key pk is registered at the CA
for identifier Pˆ . The resulting certificate C is added to
the global set of certificates and to the set of certificates
generated through pkregister query: C ← C ∪ {C} and
Cpk ← Cpk ∪ {C}. The query returns C .
– npkregister(pk, Pˆ) The query requires that pk /∈ PK
and that VP outputs 1 on input pk and Pˆ; otherwise, it
returns ⊥. The public key pk is registered at the CA for
the identifier Pˆ . The resulting certificate C is added to
the global set of certificates and to the set of certificates
generated through npkregister query: C ← C ∪ {C} and
Cnpk ← Cnpk ∪ {C}. The query returns C .
Remark 4 (Efficiency of pkregister and npkregister
processing)Observe thatpkregister andnpkregister queries
require a membership test for set PK. In some settings, such
testsmight correspond to computationally hard problems like
quadratic residuosity orDDH.6 Wediscuss twoproblems that
might arise when analysing key exchange protocols where
PK-membership is difficult to assess: (1) If the queries, by
whatever means, correctly decide membership in PK, then
6 For instance, consider an RSA modulus N and the (cyclic)
group QRN of quadratic residues modulo N . As the CDH problem
in QRN is provably as hard as factoring N [35,42], it is conceivable
to instantiate a DL-based key agreement protocol (like UM, HMQV,
etc.) with that group. This would result in PK = QRN , and pkregister
and npkregister queries would have to perform membership tests for
this set. However, the latter is assumed to be a hard problem, by the
quadratic residuosity assumption [26].
123
ASICS: AKE security incorporating certification systems
the adversary implicitly gets access to a decision oracle for
that set; this has to be taken into account in corresponding
security reductions, e.g., when selecting appropriate hard-
ness assumptions. (2) If an analysed ASICS protocol Π is
used as a component in a higher-level construction Π ′, then
any security argument that reduces the security of Π ′ to the
security of Π will inevitably have to specify how pkregister
and npkregister oracles are to be simulated. As mentioned
before, in some settings this seems to be infeasible.
Example 1 Here, we formalize some verification procedures
that reflect practically relevant checks. Note that the algo-
rithms can access the current state of game state variables,
such as C, Cpk, Cnpk. We use q to denote the query that
invoked VP.
(a) Identity validation CAs may verify the identity of users,
for example by checking their passports or looking up
public information of companies. In practice, this means
that the adversary cannot register a key for an honest
party. This enforces a split between honest users that
generate their keys randomly by using hregister, and
dishonest users that can generate their keys in various
ways, and use pkregister and npkregister. We model
this behaviour by abstracting from the concrete passport
checking and instead give an abstract verification pro-
cedure whose behaviour mimics the concrete validation
behaviour.
VP(pk, Pˆ)
=
⎧
⎨
⎩
1 if (q=hregister ∧ ¬∃C ∈Cpk ∪ Cnpk :C.id= Pˆ)
1 if (q ∈ QR ∧ ¬∃C ∈ Ch :C.id = Pˆ) , and
0 otherwise.
The above verification procedure prevents the adversary
from registering a key for identifier Pˆ via a query inQR if
there already exists a certificate returned as response to a
query hregister with identifier Pˆ . Similarly,VP prevents
the adversary from registering a key for identifier Pˆ via
the query hregister if there already exists a certificate
returned as response to a query in QR with identifier Pˆ .
This splits the identifiers into two disjoint sets and reflects
strong identity validation where impersonation of hon-
est users is impossible. Note that the above abstract VP
model is implemented by the actual identity validation.
(b) Uniqueness of the public key
VP(pk, Pˆ) =
{
1 if ¬∃C ∈ C :C.pk = pk , and
0 otherwise.
The verification procedure takes as input pk, Pˆ and the
global set of certificates C. If there is no certificate in C
which contains public key pk for which a certificate is
being requested, then it returns 1. Otherwise it returns 0.
(c) No two public keys for one identifier
VP(pk, Pˆ) =
{
1 if ¬∃C ∈ C :C.id = Pˆ , and
0 otherwise.
The verification procedure takes as input pk, Pˆ and the
global set of certificates C. If there is no certificate in C
which contains identifier Pˆ , then it returns 1. Otherwise
it returns 0.
(d) No checks at all
VP(pk, Pˆ) = 1 (for all pk and all Pˆ).
Remark 5 (Certificate signing requests (CSRs)) Some CAs
may require users to self-sign the data that is to be certi-
fied and to submit the resulting certificate signing request.
To model CSRs and related checks, one needs to introduce
an additional parameter φ in the definitions of the queries
hregister,pkregister, and npkregister. Then, the verifi-
cation procedure of a CA checking CSRs takes as input
pk, Pˆ and a signature φ. If φ is a valid signature on mes-
sage m = Pˆ ‖ pk, then it returns 1. Otherwise, it returns 0.
2.2 Security experiment
Using the above queries, we define a parameterized family
of AKE security models. As is common in BR-style AKE
models, we must restrict query usage so that the adversary
cannot trivially win the security experiment. The conditions
under which queries are disallowed are expressed by a fresh-
ness condition, which typically uses a matching condition to
formalize intended partner sessions.
Definition 2 (Matching, freshness, ASICSmodel) Let Π be
anASICSprotocol.Amatching condition M forΠ is a binary
relation on the set of sessions of Π . Let Q be a set of queries
such that QN ⊆ Q ⊆ QN ∪QS ∪QR . A freshness condition
F for (Π, Q) is a predicate (usually depending on a match-
ing condition M) that takes a session of Π and a sequence of
queries (including arguments and results) of a security exper-
iment over queries in Q. We call a triplet X = (M, Q, F) an
ASICS model for Π .
Definition 3 gives two possible matching conditions. Exam-
ples of freshness conditions will be given in Example 2 on
the following page, and in Sect. 4.1.
The intricacies of matching definitions in AKE protocols
are explored in detail by Cremers [18]. Two issues are impor-
tant here. First, there is a strong connection between the
information used in a matching definition and the informa-
tion used to compute the session key. Second, some protocols
like the two-message versions of MQV and HMQV allow
sessions to compute the same key even if they perform
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the same role, whereas other protocols such as NAXOS
require the sessions that compute the same key to per-
form different roles. In the remainder of the paper, we will
use one of the definitions below, depending on the type of
protocol.
Definition 3 (M1-matching, M2-matching) Let s and s′
denote two sessions of an ASICS protocol. We say that ses-
sion s′ M1-matches (or is M1-matching) session s if sstatus =
s′status = accepted and
(sacert.pk, sacert.id, spcert.pk, spcert.id, ssent, srcvd)
= (s′pcert.pk, s′pcert.id, s′acert.pk, s′acert.id, s′rcvd, s′sent).
Similarly, we say that session s′ M2-matches (or is M2-
matching) session s if s′ M1-matches session s and srole =
s′role.
Thus, we will use M1 for protocols such as the two-
message versions of MQV and HMQV, and we will use M2
for protocols such as NAXOS.
Remark 6 (Comparison to matching definition if only one
keyper identifier is allowed)Note thatwhenusers are allowed
to have multiple public keys, matching sessions (that is,
intended communication partners) of some AKE protocols
will not always compute the same session key if the defin-
ition of matching does not require agreement on the public
keys used in the respective sessions.
The goal of the adversary is to distinguish the session key
of a fresh session from a completely random string. This is
modelled through an additional query:
– test-session (s) This query requires that session s
exists and that sstatus = accepted; otherwise, it
returns ⊥. A bit b is chosen at random. If b = 1, then
skey is returned. If b = 0, a random element of {0, 1}k is
returned.
Definition 4 (ASICSX experiment)LetΠ be anASICSpro-
tocol and X = (M, Q, F) be an ASICS model for Π . We
define experiment ASICSX between an adversary E and a
challenger who implements all users and the CA as follows:
1. The experiment is initialized with domain parameters for
security parameter k.
2. The adversary E can perform any sequence of queries
from Q.
3. At some point in the experiment, E issues a test-session
query for a session s that has accepted and satisfies F at
the time the query is issued.
4. The adversary may continue with queries from Q, under
the condition that the test session must continue to sat-
isfy F .
5. Finally, E outputs a bit b′ as E’s guess for test-session’s
bit b.
Definition 5 (ASICSX advantage) The adversary E wins
theASICSX security experiment if its output matches the bit
b chosen in the test-session query. TheASICSX -advantage
of E is defined as AdvASICSXΠ,E (k) = |2 Pr(b = b′) − 1|.
Definition 6 (ASICS security) Let Π be an ASICS protocol
and X = (M, Q, F) be an ASICS model. Π is said to be
secure in ASICS model X if, for all PPT adversaries E , it
holds that
1. if two users successfully accept in M-matching sessions,
then they both compute the same session key, and
2. E has no more than a negligible advantage in winning
the ASICSX experiment; that is, there exists a negligi-
ble function negl in the security parameter k such that
AdvASICSXΠ,E (k) ≤ negl(k).
Remark 7 (Implicit authentication) Note that the ASICS
security definition, like eCK-style security definitions, only
provides implicit peer authentication, meaning that the key
could only be known by the peer, not explicit authentication
that the peer actually was active in the session.
Remark 8 (Comparison to other models, incl. BR, CK and
eCK) By choosing the appropriate subset of queries and def-
initions of freshness and matching, our parameterized model
can be instantiated to produce many existing AKE mod-
els. The vast majority of existing models assume honestly
generated key pairs that are securely distributed to users.
They therefore lackpkregister andnpkregister queries.Our
model family includes the eCK model [32] and the eCKw
model [19] as special cases. These models capture the leak-
age of session-specific ephemeral data. It also includes the
eCK-PFS model [19] incorporating perfect forward secrecy.
The Bellare–Rogaway model [5] can be captured in our
approach by including timestamps as part of the messages,
to accurately model the matching definition from [5]. Unlike
the CK model [14], we do not assume unique session iden-
tifiers to be available to the protocol up-front. We do not
consider this a drawback as real-world protocols usually do
not have such identifiers either. Instead, our family includes
the basic CKHMQV model [30] in which the HMQV protocol
was analysed. For the CK and CKHMQV models, we have
chosen to interpret the session state to be the session ran-
domness, in the same fashion as the models have been used
by their original authors [14,30].
Remark 9 (Freshness depends on the set of allowed queries
and on the matching definition) Note that the exact definition
of freshness F used in a security model X will likely depend
essentially on the set of queries Q available to the adversary
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in that model, as well as the specific matching definition. For
example, when Q includes pkregister and/or npkregister
queries, then we will require an additional restriction on the
registration status of the specific public key of the peer used
in the test session.
Example 2 Let us consider the following ASICS model as a
concrete example. Let X = (M1, Q, F) be the ASICSmodel
given by Q = QN ∪ {session-key} ∪ QR and F defined as
follows. Given a session s and a sequence of queries, F holds
if:
– no session-key(s) query has been issued, and
– for all sessions s′ such that s′ M1-matches s, no query
session-key(s′) has been issued, and
– no query pkregister(spcert.pk, spcert.id) has been issued.
The model X is an extension of a BR-like model with a
CA that allows registration of arbitrary keys. If a protocol is
secure in X , then it is secure even if the adversary can register
arbitrary bitstrings as public keys, as long as the specific peer
key used in the test session is not generated by the adversary.
2.3 Capturing attacks
We illustrate how several attacks exploiting the adversary’s
ability to register valid or invalid public keys can be captured
in ASICS models.
Kaliski’s onlineUKSattack againstMQV [28]Basingon the
observations from Example 2, Kaliski’s attack against MQV
is captured by an ASICS model where the adversary can
register a specific (valid) public key with his own identifier
via apkregister query.As the adversary knows the secret key
corresponding to the registered public key, the attack cannot
be prevented by VP requiring a proof-of-possession of the
secret key.
UKS attack against KEA based on public key re-registration
[33, p. 380] Suppose that public key pk has been hon-
estly registered at the CA for some user with identifier Pˆ
via an hregister(pk, Pˆ) query. In the UKS attack on the
KEA protocol, the adversary re-registers the public key
pk under his own identifier Lˆ = Pˆ by issuing the query
pkregister(pk, Lˆ). The attack is prevented if VP checks for
uniqueness of the public key and outputs 0 when the public
key was certified before (as observed in [33, p. 381]). Note
that the UKS attack can also be prevented by making the
session key derivation depend on users’ identifiers.
UKS attack against KEA+ based on impersonation attack
during key registration Lauter and Mityagin [33] produced
the KEA+ protocol from the KEA protocol and Protocol 4
in [7] by incorporating the identifiers of the user and its peer
in the session key computation to prevent UKS attacks; how-
ever, a similar UKS attack first identified in the current paper
still works on the KEA+ protocol. This attack involves (a)
a type of impersonation during key registration [45, p. 3] as
it requires the adversary to successfully impersonate a user
to the CA who then issues a certificate containing the user’s
identifier, but the adversary’s valid public key, and (b) imper-
sonation of that user during the key exchangephase.We stress
that the attack does not arise when only one public key per
identifier can be registered.
Our UKS attack against KEA+ is captured in the
ASICS model Z = (M2, Q, F) given by Q = QN ∪
{session-key}∪ {pkregister} and F defined as follows. We
say that a session s satisfies F if it holds that
– no session-key(s) query has been issued, and
– for all sessions s′ such that s′ M2-matches s, no query
session-key(s′) has been issued, and
– no query pkregister(spcert.pk, spcert.id) has been issued.
We next show that KEA+ is insecure inASICSmodel Z . The
adversary creates an initiator session via the query create
(s = (C, i), I,C ′), where the public keys C.pk = A = ga
and C ′.pk = B = gb were honestly registered via the
query hregister. Let C.id = Aˆ. Now the adversary regis-
ters a second public key A′ = Ar , for some r in Zp, with
identifier Aˆ, by issuing the query pkregister(A′, Aˆ) return-
ing certificate C ′′. He then creates a responder session via
the query create(s′ = (C ′, j),R,C ′′) and activates session
s′ by sending the message X = gx sent by session s to
session s′. The adversary intercepts the response Y = gy
sent by session s′, modifies it by setting Y ′ = Yr , and
then sends message Y ′ to session s. Session s accepts the
key skey = H(Y ′a, Bx , Aˆ, Bˆ) as the session key, while ses-
sion s′ accepts as its key s′key = H(A′y, Xb, Aˆ, Bˆ). The
completed session s is chosen as the test session. Now a
session-key query to session s′ reveals the session key of the
test session. The sessions s and s′ are notM2-matching (since
srcvd = s′sent), but compute the same session key. This leads
to our UKS attack. Adding either the long-term public keys
of both actor and peer or the exchanged messages (in addi-
tion to the identifiers) in the session key computation would
prevent the attack, since then the session keys computed in
both sessions would be different with overwhelming prob-
ability (assuming that H is modelled as a random oracle).
Alternatively, the attack can be prevented by VP requiring
identity validation as described in Example 1; this verifi-
cation procedure prevents the adversary from registering a
key for identifier Aˆ via the query pkregister as there already
exists a certificate returned as response to the queryhregister
with identifier Aˆ. Note that if KCI attacks are permitted in the
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model, the UKS attack cannot be prevented by VP requiring
a proof-of-possession of the secret key corresponding to the
public key A′.
Online UKS attack on STS-MAC based on duplicate-
signature key selection (DSKS) [9] Suppose that the signa-
ture scheme employed in the STS-MAC protocol is vulner-
able to DSKS attacks. Note that resistance to DSKS attacks
is not covered by standard security notions for signatures
such as EUF-CMA or SEUF-CMA security, which concern
only single keys. The UKS attack on STS-MAC [9, p. 160]
exploits the ability of the adversary to register a valid pub-
lic key pk with known secret key under his own identifier
during the run of the protocol. More precisely, the adver-
sary first intercepts a user’s message containing a signature
σ on message m. He then issues a query pkregister(pk, Lˆ)
such that σ is also a valid signature on m under pk. The
query associates pk with the adversary’s identifier Lˆ . Since
the adversary knows the secret key corresponding to pk,
he obtains a certificate from the CA even if VP requires a
proof-of-possession. Countermeasures to such UKS attacks
via modification of the protocol are available [9].
Lim–Lee-style attack against HMQV with special domain
parameters, without validation of ephemeral public keys [37]
Suppose that the underlying group G is a subgroup of the
group of unitsU (R) of a ring R containing an element T = 0
such that T 2 = 0. Then, the HMQV protocol is vulnerable
to the attack described in [37, p. 137] with respect to an
ASICS model in which the adversary is only given access to
standard protocol execution queries in the set QN . However,
as mentioned in [37, p. 134], this attack on HMQV can only
be launched in certain exotic groups that have never been
considered for practical use. The attack can be eliminated by
restricting the group used for analysing HMQV in some way
or by adding group membership tests on ephemeral public
keys to the protocol.
Lim–Lee-style attack against HMQVwith DSA domain para-
meters, without validation of ephemeral public keys [36]
Let G = 〈g〉 denote a q-order subgroup of Z∗p, where q
and p are prime and (p − 1)/q is smooth (i.e., it contains
no large prime factor). The attack on two-pass HMQV [36,
p. 5] can be captured in an ASICS model where the adver-
sary is given access to at least the queries in the set
Q = QN ∪ (QS\{corrupt}) ∪ (QR\{pkregister}). In par-
ticular, the attack requires that the adversary can register
invalid public keys via the npkregister query and reveal
the randomness and the session keys via the randomness
and session-key queries. This attack can be prevented by
countermeasures such as requiring VP to include a group
membership test on the public key submitted for certification,
or by including group membership tests on both ephemeral
and long-term public keys during protocol execution. Small
subgroup attacksmay also exist in other settings, for instance
in groups induced by elliptic curves.
We revisit some of the previously mentioned attacks in
Sect. 4.2 to illustrate that the modular approach that we
develop in Sect. 3 cannot be applied to the corresponding
protocols.
3 Achieving ASICS security
We provide a modular approach to obtain provable ASICS
security for certain types of protocols. We first show in
Theorem 1 how a result from Kudla and Paterson [31, Theo-
rem 2] can be adapted to incorporate adversarial registration
of valid public keys. Then, in Theorem 2, we indicate how
to transform protocols to achieve security in the presence of
adversaries that can register arbitrary invalid public keys.We
start by defining an adapted version of strong partnering [31].
Definition 7 (Strong partnering) Let Π be an ASICS pro-
tocol, and let X = (M, Q, F) be an ASICS model. We say
that Π has strong partnering in the ASICSX experiment if
no PPT adversary, when attacking Π in the ASICSX exper-
iment, can establish two sessions s and s′ of protocol Π
holding the same session key without being M-matching,
with more than negligible probability in the security para-
meter k.
We next define an adapted version of the session string
decisional problem [31] for an ASICS protocol.
Definition 8 (Session string decisional problem) Let Π be
an ASICS protocol and let X = (M, Q, F) be an ASICS
model. The session string decisional problem for Π is the
algorithmic problem of deciding, for an arbitrary session s
with sstatus = accepted in an ASICSX experiment and an
arbitrary string m, whether or not m = ss, where ss is the
session string of session s.
Given an ASICS model X = (M, Q, F), we denote by
cNR-X (using terminology from [31], where cNR stands for
“computational No-Reveals”, referring to the absence of ses-
sion key reveals) the reduced computationalASICSX exper-
iment which is similar to the ASICSX experiment except
that the adversary (a) is not allowed to issue session-key
and test-session queries, (b) must pick a session that has
accepted and satisfies F at the end of its execution, and (c)
output the session key for this session. See Kudla and Pater-
son [31] for a more detailed description of reduced games.
Definition 9 (cNR-X security) LetΠ be anASICS protocol
and X = (M, Q, F) be an ASICS model. Π is said to be
cNR-X-secure if, for all PPT adversaries E , it holds that
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Fig. 1 Messages for generic
DH-type ASICS protocol
1. if two users successfully accept in M-matching sessions,
then they both compute the same session key, and
2. E has no more than a negligible advantage in winning
the cNR-X experiment; that is, there exists a negligi-
ble function negl in the security parameter k such that
AdvcNR-XΠ,E (k) ≤ negl(k), where AdvcNR-XΠ,E (k) is defined
as the probability that E outputs (s, skey) for a session s
that has accepted and satisfies F .
Our first theorem deals with the security of DH-type ASICS
protocols, which are a generalization of DH-type AKE pro-
tocols of Cremers and Feltz [19] to include certificates and
to explicitly identify session strings. This class of protocols
includes the most prominent modern two-message AKE pro-
tocols.
Definition 10 (DH-typeASICS protocol) ADH-type ASICS
protocol is an ASICS protocol of the following form, speci-
fied by functions fI , fR, FI , FR, H :
– Domain parameters (G, g, q), where G = 〈g〉 is a group
of prime order q generated by g.
– KeyGen(): Choose a ∈R [0, q−1]. Set A ← ga . Return
secret key sk = a and public key pk = A.
– VP(x, Pˆ) = 1 for all x and all Pˆ (i.e., the CAs do not
perform any checks).
– When the initiator is activated to create a new session
s with a create(s = (C, i), r = I,C ′) query, where
the secret key corresponding to C.pk is a, the initia-
tor computes an outgoing ephemeral public key X ←
g fI(srand,a,C,C
′) and returns X as an outgoing message.
– The responder is activated to create a new session s′ with
a create(s = (C ′, j), r = R,C) query, where the secret
key corresponding to C ′.pk is b.
– When the responder is activated in a session s′ with a
send(s′, M = X), the responder computes an outgoing
ephemeral public key Y ← g fR(s′rand,b,C ′,C) and returns
Y as an outgoing message. The responder computes a
session string (an intermediate value to which we give a
special name)
ss′ ← FR( fR(s′rand, b,C ′,C), b, X,C ′,C),
a session key s′key ← H(ss′), and accepts by setting
s′status ← accepted.
– When the initiator is activated in a session s with a
send(s, M = Y ), the initiator computes a session string
ss ← FI
(
fI(srand, a,C,C ′), a,Y,C,C ′
)
, a session
key skey ← H(ss), and accepts by setting sstatus ←
accepted. The structure of protocols of this type is
also clarified in Fig. 1.
Theorem 1 Let X = (M, Q, F) be an ASICS model with
QN ⊆ Q ⊆ QN ∪ QS. Let Y = (M, Q′, F ′) be the ASICS
model where Q′ = Q ∪ {pkregister} and F ′ is defined as
follows. A session s is said to satisfy F ′ if it satisfies F and
no pkregister(spcert.pk, spcert.id) query has been issued. Let
Π be a DH-type ASICS protocol. Suppose that
– Π has strong partnering in the ASICSY experiment,
– cNR-X security of the related protocol π (defined in the
same way as Π except that the session key generated
in π is the session string of Π (i.e., sπkey = ssΠ )) is
probabilistic polynomial-time reducible to the hardness
of the computational problem of some relation φ,
– the session string decisional problem in the ASICSY
experiment for Π is polynomial-time reducible to the
decisional problem of φ, and
– there is apolynomial-timealgorithm that decideswhether
an arbitrary bitstring is an element of G,
then the security of Π in ASICS model Y is probabilistic
polynomial-time reducible to the hardness of the gap problem
of φ, if H is modelled as a random oracle.
In the cNR-X experiment of Theorem 1 the queries
session-key and pkregister are not allowed, whereas in
ASICSY both queries are allowed. Theorem 1 states that for
any DH-type protocol Π , under certain conditions, it holds
that security of the related protocol π in a reduced model (in
which public keys can only be honestly registered) implies
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security of Π in the stronger non-reduced model that addi-
tionally captures adversarial registration of valid public keys.
The following theorem, which is applicable to a wider
range of protocols than Theorem 1 (e.g., to three-message
protocols such as UM [38] or HMQV-C [29]), allows us to
achieve security against adversaries that can obtain certifi-
cates from the CA for invalid public keys by transforming
the protocol to include a group membership test on the peer’s
public key. In contrast to Theorem 1, no additional require-
ment is imposed on the freshness condition of model Y .
Theorem 2 Let X = (M, Q, F) be an ASICS model with
QN ⊆ Q ⊆ QN ∪ QS ∪ (QR\{npkregister}).
Let Π be an ASICS protocol where the domain parame-
ters (G, g, q), the key generation algorithmKeyGen and the
verification procedure VP are as in Definition 10.
Let f (Π) denote the ASICS protocol derived from Π
by adding the following protocol step for each role of the
protocol. Upon creation with (or, via send, receipt of) the
certificateC ′ to be used for the peer of session s, the user run-
ning session s checks whether the public key C ′.pk belongs
to the group G before continuing the execution of the proto-
col. In case the check fails, the protocol execution is aborted
and sstatus is set to rejected.
Suppose that protocol Π is secure in ASICS model X
and that there is a polynomial-time algorithm that decides
whether an arbitrary bitstring is an element of G. Then,
the transformed protocol f (Π) is secure in ASICS model
Y = (M, Q ∪ {npkregister}, F).
The relative strengths of security between game-based
security models were investigated by Choo et al. [17], and
formally defined by Cremers and Feltz [20] as follows. Let
secure(X,Π) be a predicate that is true if and only if the
protocol Π is secure in security model X .
Definition 11 [20] Let π be a class of AKE protocols. Let
X and Y be two security models. We say that model Y is
at least as strong as model X with respect to π , denoted by
X ≤πSec Y , if
∀ Π ∈ π. secure(Y,Π) ⇒ secure(X,Π). (1)
We say that model Y is stronger than model X with respect
to protocol class π , if X ≤πSec Y and not Y ≤πSec X .
Definition 12 Letπ be a class ofAKEprotocols.We say that
two security models X and Y are equally strongwith respect
to π , denoted by X =πSec Y , if X ≤πSec Y and Y ≤πSec X ,
where the relation ≤πSec is as in Definition 11.
Remark 10 Let π be the class of ASICS protocols where
the domain parameters (G, g, q), the key generation algo-
rithm KeyGen are as in Definition 10 and the verification
procedure VP(x, Pˆ) outputs 1 if x ∈ G and 0 otherwise.
Let X = (M, Q, F) with QN ⊆ Q ⊆ QN ∪ QS ∪
(QR\{npkregister}) and Y = (M, Q ∪ {npkregister}, F).
It is easy to verify that theASICSmodels X andY are equally
strong with respect to π according to Definition 12. When-
ever the adversary issues a query npkregister in anASICSY
experiment, the symbol ⊥ is returned. Thus, transforming an
ASICS protocol from protocol class π as described in The-
orem 2 does not yield a protocol that is secure in a stronger
ASICSmodel. In contrast, themodelY is stronger thanmodel
X with respect to the protocol class considered in Theorem 2.
Combining both theorems, we obtain the following result.
Corollary 1 Let Π be a DH-type ASICS protocol. Let X =
(M, Q, F) and Y = (M, Q′, F ′) be defined as in Theorem 1,
and let the conditions of Theorem 1 hold with respect to
protocol Π . Let f (Π) denote the protocol derived from Π
as specified in Theorem 2. Then, the transformed protocol
f (Π) is secure in ASICS model Z = (M, Q′′, F ′), where
Q′′ = Q′ ∪ {npkregister}, if H is modelled as a random
oracle.
Applying Corollary 1 to a concrete DH-type ASICS protocol
that satisfies all the preconditions, we obtain a protocol that
is secure in an ASICSmodel in which (a) sessions (including
the test session)may use a certificate for the peer that resulted
from an npkregister query, and (b) the certificate of the test
session’s peer was not the result of a pkregister query.
4 Applications
To illustrate the power of our generic approach, we examine
in Sect. 4.1 how to apply our technique to Ustaoglu’s CMQV
protocol [46]. CMQV is a modern DH-type protocol that
is comparable in efficiency to HMQV, but enjoys a simpler
security proof in the eCK model.
Our results allow us to analyse CMQV in a model
that does not include queries session-key,pkregister, and
npkregister, which simplifies the overall proof. We verify
that CMQV meets the preconditions of Corollary 1 and con-
clude that a variant of CMQVwith groupmembership test on
the peer’s public key is ASICS-secure in an eCK-like model.
Similarly, our generic approach can be applied to other DH-
type candidates such asNAXOS[32] andUP [47].Wediscuss
in Sect. 4.2 where the preconditions of Corollary 1 are vio-
lated for protocols from Sect. 2.3 such as MQV or HMQV.
4.1 CMQV
CMQV [46] was originally proven secure in the eCK model,
where there is only one public key per identifier. In theASICS
setting, there is no such unique mapping between user iden-
tifiers and public keys. Hence, to be able to prove CMQV
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Fig. 2 Specification of
fI , fR, FI , FR for CMQV
secure in the ASICS model, we need to include the public
keys of the users in the session string to ensure that they have
the same view of these keys when deriving the session key.
CMQV as a DH-type ASICS protocol Two-pass CMQV can
be stated as a DH-type ASICS protocol, by instantiating Def-
inition 10 with the following functions. Let H1 : {0, 1}k ×
Z
∗
q → Z∗q ,H2 : {0, 1}∗ → Zq , and H : {0, 1}∗ → {0, 1}k
be hash functions. We define fI , fR, FI , FR as in Fig. 2,
where d = H2(X ‖ C.id ‖ C ′.id), e = H2(Y ‖ C.id ‖
C ′.id), A = C.pk, B = C ′.pk; ‖ denotes tagged concatena-
tion to avoid ambiguity with variable-length strings.
We now show, using Corollary 1, that the resulting DH-
typeCMQVprotocol is a secureASICSprotocol in anASICS
model with leakage queries corresponding to the eCKmodel.
ASICS model for eCK-like leakage Define the ASICSmodel
eCK = (M2, Q, F) for eCK-like leakage [32] as follows.
Let Q = QN ∪ QS . Let F be the condition that a session s
satisfies F if, for all sessions s′ such that s′ M2-matches s,
none of the following conditions hold:
– a session-key(s) query has been issued;
– if s′ exists:
– a session-key(s′) query has been issued;
– both corrupt(sacert.pk) and randomness(s) have
been issued;
– both corrupt(s′acert.pk) and randomness(s′) queries
have been issued;
– if s′ does not exist:
– both corrupt(sacert.pk) and randomness(s) have
been issued;
– a corrupt(spcert.pk) query has been issued.
Theorem 3 Let f (CMQV) be the DH-type ASICS proto-
col derived from the CMQV protocol defined above, as
specified in Theorem 2. If H1,H2 and H are modelled as
random oracles, G is a group where the gap Diffie–Hellman
assumption holds and membership in G is decidable in
polynomial time, then f (CMQV) is secure in ASICS model
Z = (M2,QN ∪ QS ∪ QR, F ′), where a session s is said
to satisfy F ′ if it satisfies the freshness condition F from the
eCK model and no pkregister(spcert.pk, spcert.id) query has
been issued.
Proof (Sketch)We can readily show that CMQV satisfies the
preconditions of Corollary 1 under the above formulation of
the eCK model as an ASICS model:
1. Strong partnering It is straightforward to see that CMQV
has strong partnering in the ASICSeCK′ game (where
eCK′ is derived from eCK as described in Theorem 1):
since the session key in CMQV is computed via a random
oracle, the probability that two sessions derive the same
session key without using the same session string input
to the random oracle is negligible.
2. cNR-eCK-security of session string variant of CMQV
This can be shown by an adaptation of Ustaoglu’s origi-
nal proof of CMQV. In large part, the main proof can be
followed. However, a few simplifications can be made
because the simulation need not answer session-key
queries (so preventing key replication attacks and simu-
lating sessions where the public key is a challenge value
are easier).
3. Hardness of the session string decision problem It can be
easily seen that this is polynomial-time reducible to the
decisional problem for Diffie–Hellman triples (U, V,W )
by noting that the first component of the CMQV session
string σ is equal to
g(y+eb)(x+da) = gxygadygbex gabde.
The DDH values (U, V ) can be injected into either
(X,Y ), (A,Y ), (B, X), or (A, B), with W inserted into
the corresponding part of σ , yielding a polynomial-time
reduction.
Detailed proofs of each of the above claims can be found in
Appendix 2. unionsq
4.2 Discussion
In Sect. 4.1, we provided evidence that ourmodular approach
can indeed be successfully applied to reason about the secu-
rity of prominent key exchange protocols. Here, we inspect
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which preconditions of Corollary 1 are violated for some
commonly analysed protocols.
Let X1 = (M1, Q, F) be the ASICS model given by
Q = QN ∪ {session-key} and F defined as follows. We
say that a session s satisfies F if it holds that neither a
session-key(s) query nor a session-key(s′) query for any
session s′ that is M1-matching s have been issued. Let
Y1 = (M1, Q′, F ′) be derived from X1 as specified in The-
orem 1. The UKS attacks described in Sect. 2.3 against the
DH-type protocols MQV and KEA caused two sessions that
were not M1-matching to compute the same session key.
Thus, the first precondition of Corollary 1 is violated for
these protocols as they do not have strong partnering in the
ASICSY1 experiment. The two-pass HMQV protocol with-
out ephemeral public key validation is insecure in ASICS
model X1 when special domain parameters are used (see
Sect. 2.3) due to the lack of ephemeral public key valida-
tion. Hence, it is easy to see that the related protocol, that
we call HMQV’, is not cNR-X1-secure, which violates the
second precondition of Corollary 1. Even though it is unclear
whether there is an attack against two-passHMQVwithDSA
domain parameters without ephemeral public key validation,
the third precondition of Theorem 1 is violated for this ver-
sion of the HMQV protocol. The lack of ephemeral public
key validation hinders us from using a DDH oracle to solve
the session string decisional problem for the protocol since
there is no guarantee that all inputs to the DDH oracle belong
to the group G. The latter observations on HMQV lead us
to the conclusion that validation of ephemeral public keys
is necessary to be able to apply Corollary 1 to the HMQV
protocol, even when the adversary is not given access to the
randomness query.
Let X2 = (M2, Q, F) be the ASICS model given by Q =
QN ∪{session-key} and F defined as follows.We say that a
session s satisfies F if it holds that neither a session-key(s)
query nor a session-key(s′) query for any session s′ that
is M2-matching s have been issued. Let Y2 = (M2, Q′, F ′)
be derived from X2 as specified in Theorem 1. Note that
model Y2 corresponds to the model X defined in Sect. 2.3
capturing the UKS attack against KEA+. The latter UKS
attack described against the DH-type protocol KEA+ caused
two sessions that were notM2-matching to compute the same
session key. Thus, the first precondition of Corollary 1 is
violated for KEA+ as this protocol does not have strong
partnering in the ASICSY2 experiment.
5 Lessons learned and recommendations
As we started our systematic investigation, we assumed that
certification authorities would need to perform some mini-
mal checks on public keys to obtain secure KE protocols.
Perhaps surprisingly, nearly all of the effort can be shifted to
the protocols; and modern protocols often perform sufficient
checks. In particular, our results provide formal foundations
for some of the protocol-specific observations of Menezes
and Ustaoglu [37]: checking that short-term as well as long-
term public keys are in the key space (i.e., in group G for
DH-type protocols) is not superfluous.
Based on these observations, and given M public keys, N
usersmay need to perform on the order of M×N such checks
in total, even when caching the results. Reasoning purely
about the overall amount of computation timeused, one could
consider moving the burden to the CAs. If the CAs only cre-
ate certificates after a successful check, the CAs would only
perform on the order of M checks in total. Depending on the
deployment scenario, this might be a preferable alternative.
Similarly, CAs do not necessarily need to check unique-
ness of public keys. As long as the key derivation involves the
identifiers in an appropriate way, UKS attacks such as the one
on KEA can be prevented. Even if the adversary re-registers
an honest user’s public key as his own public key, ASICS
security for the honest user is still guaranteed as long as the
adversary does not know the corresponding private key.
In general, our results further justify using as much infor-
mation as possible in the key derivation function (KDF). This
helps with establishing formal security proofs and it is also a
prudent engineering principle. In particular, we recommend
that in settings where users may have multiple long-term
public keys, the input to the KDF should not only include the
identifiers and the message transcript, but also the specific
public keys used in the session.
We hope our work can serve as a foundation for the
development of a range of protocols specifically designed
to incorporate certification systems, offering different trade-
offs between efficiency and trust assumptions of the involved
parties.
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Appendix 1: Proofs of Theorems 1 and 2
Proof of Theorem 1 The proof structure is similar to the
proof of Theorem 2 in [31]. We denote by Λ the session key
space associated with protocol Π . Since the cNR-X security
of protocol π is probabilistic polynomial-time reducible to
the hardness of the computational problem of some relation
φ, there exists an algorithm A that on input of a problem
instance of the computational problem of φ and interacting
with an adversary E which has non-negligible probability η
of winning the cNR-X game for π in time τ is able to solve
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the computational problem of φ with non-negligible proba-
bility h(η) and in time v(τ), for some polynomial functions
h and v.
By assumption, the session string decisional problem in
the ASICSY experiment for Π is polynomial-time reducible
to the decisional problem of φ. Hence, there is an algorithm
W which solves the session string decisional problem for Π
in polynomial-time τ ′′ given access to a decisional oracle for
φ.
Let D be an adversary winning the ASICSY experiment
against protocolΠ with non-negligible probability η′ in time
τ ′. Let K denote the event that D does not query H with the
session string ss∗ of the test session s∗. Since Π has strong
partnering in the ASICSY experiment, it holds that, with
overwhelming probability, if two sessions compute the same
session key, then they must be M-matching. Thus, if event K
occurs, then D can only win the experiment with negligible
probability u(k)+1/|Λ|, where u(k) denotes the probability
that D issues a session-key query to a session s that is not
M-matching s∗ and skey = s∗key.
We next define an algorithm B which solves the gap prob-
lem of φ with non-negligible probability h′(η′) and in time
v′(τ ′), for some polynomial functions h′ and v′, using adver-
sary D as a subroutine. B will also run algorithm A on the
problem instance of the computational problem of φ, and an
algorithm L that decides, in polynomial-time τ ′′′, whether an
arbitrary bitstring pk submitted for certification is an element
ofG.We now define B’s responses to D’s queries for the pre-
specified peer setting; the post-specified peer case proceeds
similarly. Algorithm B maintains sets of certificates Ch and
Cpk as well as lists H -List and G-List, all of which are ini-
tially empty.
1. q ∈ Q∩{kgen, randomness, corrupt}: B forwards the
query to A and passes A’s response back to D.
2. hregister(pk, Pˆ): B forwards the query to A and passes
A’s response back to D. In case A returns a certificate
C, B adds C to the set Ch , i.e., Ch ← Ch ∪ {C}.
3. pkregister(pk, Pˆ): B checks whether pk ∈ G using
algorithm L and whether VP outputs 1 on input pk and
Pˆ . If all the checks succeed, then B adds a certificate C
to the set Cpk, i.e., Cpk ← Cpk ∪{C}, and returns C . Else,
B returns ⊥.
4. create
(
s = (C, i) , r,C ′): B checks whether C ∈ Ch , a
session s with counter i has not yet been created, r ∈
{I,R}, and C ′ ∈ Ch ∪ Cpk. If one of the checks fails,
then B returns ⊥. Else if C ′ ∈ Cpk, then B answers D’s
query by simulating the protocol execution itself. Else,
B forwards the query to A and passes A’s response (if
any) to D.
5. send (s, M): If session s does not exist or if sstatus =
active, then B returns ⊥. Else if spcert ∈ Cpk, then B
responds to the query by simulating the protocol execu-
tion itself. Else B forwards the query to A and passes A’s
response (if any) to D.
6. H query: To answer D’s queries to the random oracle for
H, B stores entries of the form (xi , λi )with λi ∈ Λ in the
H -List. When D makes a query x to the random oracle
for H, B determines the return value for D as follows:
– If there exists an entry (xi , λi ) in the H -List with
xi = x , then return λi .
– Else if there is an entry (sacert.id, sacert.pk, spcert.id,
spcert.pk, srole, ssent, srcvd, λi ) in theG-List, for some
session s that has accepted and λi ∈ Λ, such that x
is the session string of session s (i.e., x = ss) using
algorithmW , then store the entry (x, λi ) in the H -List
and return λi .
– Else, B chooses λ ∈R Λ, stores the entry (x, λ) in
the H -List and return λ.
7. session-key(s) : To answer D’s session-key queries,
B stores entries of the form (sacert.id, sacert.pk, spcert.id,
spcert.pk, srole, ssent, srcvd, λi ) with λi ∈ Λ in the G-List.
When D makes a session-key(s) query to an initiator
session s that has accepted, B determines the return value
for D as follows:
– If there exists an entry (sacert.id, sacert.pk, spcert.id,
spcert.pk, I, ssent, , srcvd, λi ) in the G-List, for some
λi ∈ Λ, then return λi .
– Else if there is an entry (spcert.id, spcert.pk, sacert.id,
sacert.pk,R, srcvd, ssent, λi ) in the G-List, then B
stores the entry (sacert.id, sacert.pk, spcert.id, spcert.pk,
I, ssent, srcvd, λi ) in the G-List and returns λi .
– Else if there exists an entry of the form (xi , λi ) in the
H -List, where xi = ss using algorithm W , then B
stores the entry (sacert.id, sacert.pk, spcert.id, spcert.pk,
I, ssent, srcvd, λi ) in the G-List and returns λi .
– Else, B chooses λ ∈R Λ, stores the entry (sacert.id,
sacert.pk, spcert.id, spcert.pk, I, ssent, srcvd, λ) in the
G-List, and returns λ.
A session-key query to a responder session that has
accepted is answered similarly.
8. test-session(s∗): B selects μ ∈R Λ and returns μ to D.
9. D outputs a guess: B aborts with failure.
B can detect the complementary event Kc by checkingwhich
of the entries (xi , λi ) in the H -List has xi = ss∗ using algo-
rithm W . B then passes xi to A. Since the test session s∗
must be fresh, no pkregister(s∗pcert.pk, s∗pcert.id) occurred in
the ASICSY experiment and hence the certificate s∗pcert has
been output through an hregister(s∗pcert.pk, s∗pcert.id) query.
A solves the computational problem ofφ with non-negligible
probability h(η), where η = η′(1 − u(k) − 1/|Λ|). B is
successful by outputting A’s solution to the instance of the
computational problem of φ and solves the gap problem of
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φ with non-negligible probability h(η) and in time v(τ),
where τ = τ ′ + τ ′′nH (nsession-key + 1) + τ ′′′npkregister
with nH , nsession-key and npkregister denoting the number of
H, session-key andpkregister queries issued by D, respec-
tively. unionsq
Remark 11 We cannot show that Theorem 1 holds for more
complex protocols Π such as UM or HMQV-C in arbitrary
ASICS base models as the simulation of non-test sessions s
ofΠ with spcert being the result of a pkregister query cannot
be performed in the appropriate way without the knowledge
of long-term secret keys and without violating the freshness
condition.
Proof of Theorem 2 Let Π be an ASICS protocol secure in
model X . It is straightforward to verify the first condition of
Definition 6, that is, that M-matching sessions of protocol
f (Π) compute the same session key. This follows from the
fact that M-matching sessions of protocol Π compute the
same key as protocol Π is secure in ASICS model X . We
next verify that the second condition of Definition 6 holds.
Claim If there is a PPT adversary E succeeding in the
ASICSY experiment against protocol f (Π) with non-
negligible advantage in time τ ′, then we can construct a PPT
adversary E ′ succeeding in the ASICSX experiment against
protocol Π with non-negligible advantage in time v(τ) (for
some polynomial function v) using adversary E as a subrou-
tine. Let L be an algorithm that decides, in polynomial-time
τ ′′, whether an arbitrary bitstring pk submitted for certifica-
tion is an element of G.
Proof. Fix a PPT adversary E succeeding in the ASICSY
experiment against protocol f (Π) with non-negligible
advantage. We define an algorithm E ′ which succeeds in the
ASICSX experiment against protocolΠ with non-negligible
advantage using E as a subroutine. Algorithm E ′ maintains
sets of certificates Ch, Cpk and Cnpk, all of which are initially
empty, and answers E’s queries in the pre-specified peer set-
ting as follows.
1. q ∈ Q ∩ {kgen, randomness, corrupt, session-key}:
E ′ issues the same query and returns the answer to E .
2. hregister(pk, Pˆ): When E issues an hregister(pk, Pˆ)
query, E ′ issues the same query and returns the answer
to E . In case a certificate C is returned, E ′ adds C to the
set Ch , i.e., Ch ← Ch ∪ {C}.
3. pkregister(pk, Pˆ): When E issues a pkregister(pk, Pˆ)
query, E ′ issues the same query and returns the answer
to E . In case a certificate C is returned, E ′ adds C to the
set Cpk, i.e., Cpk ← Cpk ∪ {C}.
4. npkregister(pk, Pˆ): E ′ checks whether pk /∈ G (using
algorithm L) and VP outputs 1 on input pk and Pˆ . If the
checks succeed (i.e., pk /∈ G and VP(pk, Pˆ) = 1), then
E ′ returns a certificate C to E and adds C to the set Cnpk,
i.e., Cnpk ← Cnpk ∪ {C}. Otherwise, E ′ returns ⊥.
5. create
(
s = (C, i) , r,C ′): E ′ checks whether C ∈ Ch ,
a session s with counter i has not yet been created, r ∈
{I,R}, and C ′ ∈ Ch ∪ Cpk ∪ Cnpk. If one of the checks
fails, then E ′ returns ⊥. Else if C ′ ∈ Ch ∪ Cpk, then E ′
issues the same query and returns the answer (if any) to
E . Else, E ′ rejects the session creation and sets sstatus to
rejected.
6. send (s, M): If session s does not exist or if sstatus =
active, then E ′ returns ⊥. Else E ′ issues the same
query and returns the response (if any) to E .
7. test-session(s): When E issues a test-session(s)
query to a session s that has accepted, E ′ issues the same
test-session query and returns the answer to E .
8. At the end of E’s execution, that is, after it has output its
guess b′, E ′ outputs b′ as well.
It follows that AdvASICSYf (Π),E (k) ≤ AdvASICSXΠ,E ′ (k), and adver-
sary E ′ runs in time v(τ) with τ = τ ′ + τ ′′nnpkregister, for
some polynomial function v, where nnpkregister denotes the
number ofnpkregister queriesmade by E . SinceΠ is secure
in ASICS model X,AdvASICSYf (Π),E (k) is bounded above by a
negligible function in the security parameter k. unionsq
Appendix 2: Analysis of CMQV
Let eCK′ = (M2, Q′, F ′) be the ASICS model where Q′ =
Q ∪ {pkregister} and F ′ is defined as F with the additional
requirement that no pkregister(spcert.pk, spcert.id) query has
been issued.
Lemma 1 Let eCK and eCK′ be as above. CMQV has
strong partnering in the ASICSeCK′ experiment under the
assumption that H is a random oracle.
Proof Suppose otherwise. Namely, suppose there exists two
sessions s and s′ of CMQV that hold the same session key
but are not M2-matching. Since the session key in CMQV is
derived by applying a random oracle, except with negligible
probability, the input to the random oracle in both sessions
must be the same. Since they are not M2 matching, either
sacert.id = s′pcert.id, or sacert.pk = s′pcert.pk, or spcert.id =
s′acert.id, or spcert.pk = s′acert.pk, or ssent = s′rcvd, or srcvd =
s′sent, or srole = s′role.
First suppose srole = s′role. Then, either the public keys,
identifiers, or transcripts of the two sessions do not corre-
spond. But these are all inputs to the random oracle, so except
with negligible probability the outputs of the random oracle
will be different, contradicting that the two sessions hold the
same session key.
Now suppose srole = s′role. Except with negligible prob-
ability, two distinct honest sessions will have srand = s′rand,
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and hence ssent = s′sent. But since both s and s′ think of
themselves as the initiator, they will each put their own sent
ephemeral public key in the second component of the call to
H , and these values are different, so except with negligible
probability the outputs of the random oracle will be different,
contradicting that the two sessions hold the same key. unionsq
Let (G, g, q) be as in Definition 10. Let φ ⊆ (G×G)×G
be the Diffie–Hellman relation on G = 〈g〉. In particular,
(ga, gb) is related underφ to gc if and only ifab ≡ c mod q.
Lemma 2 The cNR-eCK security of the variant of CMQV
in which the session string is output as the session key is
polynomial-time reducible to the computational problem of
the Diffie–Hellman relation φ, under the assumption thatH1
and H2 are random oracles.
The basic idea of the proof is as follows.
– If the adversary happens to figure out a long-term secret
key without issuing a corrupt query (event E), it must
ask that value to a randomoracleH1, andwe can immedi-
ately use that value to solve the CDH problem by having
embedded one of the CDH challenge values in that public
key.
– If the adversary is passive in the test session (event E ∧
M), we can embed the CDH challenge values U, V as
the ephemeral public keys X and Y of the test session.
The adversary’s view can be simulated perfectly unless
the adversary asks either (x˜, a) or (y˜, b) as a query for
H1. But the freshness condition prevents the adversary
from finding both elements of either pair. Therefore, the
adversary cannot do better than guess the session string
unless it can compute σ . Here, the CDH of U and V can
be extracted from σ .
– If the adversary is active in the test session (event E∧M),
we can embed the CDH challenge values in the long-term
key of the partner of the test session and the ephemeral
public key of the session. As before the simulation is
perfect unless the adversary asks (x˜, a) as a query for
H1. Note that, since the adversary is active, the adversary
cannot change or corrupt the secret long-term key of the
peer. This time the value of σ is similar to a signature
forgery and we can apply the Forking Lemma [3,39] to
extract the CDH of U and V .
Proof Recall that cNR-eCK security means security in an
ASICS model that omits the session-key query, so the
allowed queries are QN ∪ {corrupt, randomness}. The
freshness condition remains unchanged.
Recall further that the goal of the adversary is to recov-
ery the session string; let S be the event that an algorithm
M computes the session string. The security proof largely
follows the original proof of Ustaoglu that CMQV is eCK-
secure, but can be simplified somewhat as the queries in the
cNR-eCK game are restricted compared to full eCK security.
Consider the following two complementary events:
– E . There exists a certificate C ′ (created using hregister)
such that M, during its execution, queries H1(∗, b)
(where C ′.pk = gb) before issuing any corrupt(C ′.pk)
query (if it issues one at all).
– E . During its execution, for every certificate C ′ (created
using hregister) for which M queries H1(∗, b) (where
C ′.pk = gb), it issued a corrupt(C ′.pk) query before the
H1(∗, b) query.
Since the events are complementary, if M succeeds in com-
puting the session string, it succeeded eitherwhen E occurred
or when E occurred.
We will see how, when each event occurs, the required
polynomial-time reduction exists.
Event E Suppose event E occurs and M succeeds in com-
puting the session string.
Here, the simulator S guesses one public key pk∗ at
random and assigns pk∗ ← V , where (U, V ) is the Diffie–
Hellman challenge. All other public keys are generated
according to the protocol specification.
For all sessions and queries where the session actor is not
using pk∗,S follows the protocol specification exactly.
For sessions where the session actor is using pk∗,S
responds to queries as follows:
– hregister(pk∗, Pˆ): S outputs a certificate as normal.
– corrupt(pk∗): S aborts.
– randomness(s = (C, i)) where C.pk = pk∗: Return
srand.
For sessions where the session actor is using pk∗ and is the
initiator, S responds to queries as follows:
– create(s = (C, i), I,C ′) where C.pk = pk∗: S selects
x ∈R Zq , computes X ← gx , and responds with X . Note
that srand is not used in the calculation.
– send(s = (C, i), M) where sacert.pk = pk∗ and srole =
I: S does not need to simulate anything here, since there
is not outgoingmessage required, and since the only vari-
able updated is the session string ss but no session-key
reveal query is allowed.
For sessions where the session actor is using pk∗ and is the
responder, S responds to queries as follows:
– create(s = (C, i),R,C ′) where C.pk = pk∗: no
response required.
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– send(s = (C, i), M) where sacert.pk = pk∗ and srole =
R: S selects y ∈R Zq , computes Y ← gy , and responds
with Y . Note that srand is not used in the calculation.
S responds to H2 queries as normal. S responds to H1(∗, b)
queries as normal for all b such that gb = pk∗. When M
queries H1(∗, b) where gb = pk∗ = V,S outputs the solu-
tion to the Diffie–Hellman challenge (U, V ) as Ub.
Note that S’s simulation is perfect up until an abort event
from the corrupt query occurs. Given that event E occurs,
there exists some public key pk = gb for which the query
H1(∗, b) occurs before any corrupt(pk) query occurs. With
probability at least 1/nkgen, where nkgen is the number of
kgen queries made by M,S this condition holds for pk∗.
When S guesses correctly, M will indeed query H1(∗, b)
before any corrupt(pk∗) query and thus S will solve the
computational Diffie–Hellman problem.
Thus, when event E occurs, there exists a polynomial-
time reduction from a cNR-eCK adversary for the session
string variant ofCMQV to the computationalDiffie–Hellman
problem under the assumption that H1 is a random oracle,
with a tightness factor of nkgen.
Event E Wedivide this event into two complementary cases:
– M . The session s for which the adversary output the ses-
sion string has an M2-matching session s′.
– M . The session s for which the adversary output the ses-
sion string does not have an M2-matching session.
When E occurs, either M or M must also occur.
Event E ∧ M Suppose event E occurs and there is an M2-
matching session s′ for the target session s.
Here, the simulator guesses two sessions s and s′; assume
without loss of generality that srole = I and s′role = R. S
responds to all kgen,hregister, corrupt, and randomness
queries as specified by the protocol. For all sessions other
than s and s′,S responds to create and send as specified by
the protocol. For s and s′,S responds to create and send as
follows:
– create(s = (C, i), I,C ′): Return X ← U , where
(U, V ) is the Diffie–Hellman challenge. Note that srand
is not used.
– create(s′ = (C ′, i),R,C): No response required.
– send(s′, M): Return Y ← V , where (U, V ) is the
Diffie–Hellman challenge. Note that s′rand is not used.
S responds toH2 queries as normal.S responds toH1 queries
as normal except for the queries (x˜, a) or (y˜, b), where a and
b are the secret keys corresponding to the public keys in
sessions s and s′; when this occurs, the simulation aborts.
Note that S’s simulation is perfect unless a H1(x˜, a)
or H1(y˜, b) query occurs. Because of event E,M issues
a corrupt(ga) query before any H1(x˜, a) query, and a
corrupt(gb) query before any H1(y˜, b) query. Since x˜ and
y˜ are used in only one session and H1 is a random func-
tion, no information can be learned about x˜ and y˜ without
randomness(s) or randomness(s′) queries. By the fresh-
ness condition, it cannot be that both randomness(s) and
corrupt(ga) occurred, or that both randomness(s′) and
corrupt(gb) occurred. Thus, if S correctly guess s and s′,
the simulation is perfect and does not abort. This happens
with probability at least 2/n2create.
Assuming the simulation is perfect and does not abort
and that M outputs the session string, S can use this to
solve the Diffie–Hellman problem. In particular, let σ be the
shared secret in the session string output by M. Then, S out-
puts σg−abedU−beV−ad as the solution to the computational
Diffie–Hellman challenge (U, V ).
Thus,when event E∧M occurs, there exists a polynomial-
time reduction from a cNR-eCK adversary for the session
string variant ofCMQV to the computationalDiffie–Hellman
problem under the assumption that H1 is a random oracle,
with a tightness factor of n2create.
Event E ∧ M Suppose event E occurs but there is no M2-
matching session for the target session s.
Here, the simulator guesses integers j ∈R {1, . . . , nkgen},
and a session s∗. Assume without loss of generality that
s∗role = I.
For the j th query to kgen,S assigns pk∗ ← V from the
Diffie–Hellman challenge (U, V ) to be the public key; for all
other kgen queries, it responds as specified by the protocol.
All hregister queries are responded to as normal. All
corrupt queries are responded to as normal, except for
corrupt(pk∗), in which case S aborts.
Suppose that M selects s∗ as the target session and fur-
thermore that s∗pcert.pk = V .
For all sessions and queries where the session actor or peer
is not using pk∗,S follows the protocol specification exactly.
For sessions where the session actor is using pk∗,S
responds as in event E .
For sessions where the session peer is using pk∗,S
responds as specified by the protocol, except for the target
session s∗. In s∗,S responds as follows:
– create(s∗, I,C ′): S returns X ← U , where (U, V ) is
the Diffie–Hellman challenge. Note that s∗rand is not used.
– send(s∗, M): No response required.
– randomness(s∗): Return s∗rand.
– session-key(s∗): S aborts. Assuming that S correctly
guesses s∗ as the target session, this abort will never
occur.
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S responds to H2 queries as normal. S responds to H1(x˜, b)
queries as normal except for the following two
cases:
– If gb = pk∗:S outputs the solution to theDiffie–Hellman
challenge (U, V ) as Ub.
– If x˜ = s∗rand and ga = s∗acert.pk: S aborts.
Note that S’s simulation is perfect up until an abort event
from the corrupt or the H2 query occurs. Given that s∗ is
fresh and no matching session exists, no corrupt(s∗) query
is allowed and hence S does not abort for that reason. Given
that event E occurs, ifM queriesH1(s∗rand, a) such that ga =
s∗acert.pk,M must have issued a corrupt(ga) query first. But
it is also the case that s∗ is fresh, so M cannot have also
issued a randomness(s∗) query, and thus cannot know s∗rand
unless it guessed it correctly, which can be done only with
negligible probability.
Assume the simulation is perfect and does not abort, and
that M outputs the session string containing the correct
shared secret σ = guygadyguvegadev . S can then compute
η = σY−adV−ade = guy+uve. But the peer’s ephemeral
secret key y was chosen by the adversary, so without y S
cannot directly compute guv from η.
Using the Forking Lemma, S runs M on the same input
and the same random coins but with modified answers to H2
queries. Note that M must have queried
H2(Y, s∗acert.id, s∗pcert.id) to obtain e, because otherwise M
would be unable to compute σ except with negligible
probability. For the second run of M,S responds to
H2(Y, s∗acert.id, s∗pcert.id) with e′ = e selected uniformly at
random.
If M succeeds in the second run, it outputs
σ = guygad ′yguve′gad ′e′v.
S can then compute
η′ = σ ′Y−ad ′V−ad ′e′ = guyguve′ .
S can furthermore compute
(η/η′)1/(e−e′) = (guyguveg−uyg−uve′)1/(e−e′)
= guv(e−e′)/(e−e′) = guv
which is the solution to the computational Diffie–Hellman
challenge (U, V ).
Thus,when event E∧M occurs, there exists a polynomial-
time reduction from a cNR-eCK adversary for the session
string variant ofCMQV to the computationalDiffie–Hellman
problem under the assumption that H1 and H2 are random
oracles, with a tightness factor of ncreatenkgennH2c, where
c is a constant from the Forking Lemma. unionsq
Remark 12 Because in the above lemma we do not have to
prove full session key indistinguishability security of CMQV,
instead proving the hardness of session string computation
of a variant of CMQV, we can make a few simplifications
from Ustaoglu’s original proof:
– We do not have to worry about key replication attacks
(when the adversary causes two non-matching sessions
to have the same session key (that is, session string),
and then reveals the session key at one of the sessions)
because there is no session-key query.
– In event E , we do not have to worry about setting the
session string correctly for any session involving the user
whose public key has been injected with the CDH chal-
lenge, because there is no session-key query. Thus we
do not need a DDH oracle here.
– In event E ∧ M , we do not have to use the DDH oracle
to test which of the many H random oracle queries is
the solution we need: we simply output the CDH value
derived directly from the output of M.
Lemma 3 The session string decision problem for CMQV is
poly-time reducible to the decisional problem of the Diffie–
Hellman relation φ.
Proof Let D be a polynomial-time algorithm that can dis-
tinguish real CMQV session strings (g(y+eb)(x+da) ‖ X ‖
Y ‖ id ‖ A ‖ id′ ‖ B) from random session strings
(gr ‖ gx ‖ gy ‖ id ‖ ga ‖ id′ ‖ gb), for randomly chosen
a, b, x, y, r ∈R Zq , id and id′ are arbitrary binary strings,
d = H2(gx ‖ id ‖ id′), and e = H2(gy ‖ id ‖ id′).
We claim that there exists an algorithm E that can distin-
guish real Diffie–Hellman triples (gu, gv, guv) from random
triples (gu, gv, gw) for randomly chosen u, v, w ∈R Zq .
First, note that g(y+eb)(x+da) = gxy+ady+bex+abde. Using
D construct ED as follows. Let (U, V,W ) be a Diffie–
Hellman challenge. Pick arbitrary id, id′. Do one of the
following, each with equal probability:
1. Set A ← U and B ← V . Choose x, y ∈R Zq .
Run D on the session string (gxy Ady BexWde ‖ gx ‖
gy ‖ id ‖ A ‖ id′ ‖ B).
2. Set A ← U and Y ← V . Choose x, b ∈R Zq .
Run D on the session string (Y xWdgbex Abde ‖ gx ‖ Y ‖
id ‖ A ‖ id′ ‖ gb).
3. Set X ← U and B ← V . Choose a, y ∈R Zq .
Run D on the session string (X ygadyWeBade ‖ X ‖
gy ‖ id ‖ ga ‖ id′ ‖ B).
4. Set X ← U and Y ← V . Choose a, b ∈R Zq .
Run D on the session string (WYad Xbegabde ‖ X ‖ Y ‖
id ‖ ga ‖ id′ ‖ gb).
E outputs the result of D.
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Note that in each of the above cases, if (U, V,W ) is a real
Diffie–Hellman triple, then D is run on a real CMQV session
string, whereas if (U, V,W ) is a random triple, then D is run
on a random session string. Thus, if D is a distinguisher
for CMQV session strings, then E is a distinguisher for the
Diffie–Hellman relation. unionsq
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